The Pentagon launches a large-scale review of covert psychological operations
Complaints about U.S. military influence operations using Facebook and Twitter have raised concerns in the White House and federal agencies.
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A Pentagon spokesperson said that military information operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable laws and policies. (Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP)
The Pentagon has ordered a large-scale review of how it conducts covert information warfare after major social media companies identified and disabled fake accounts suspected of being operated by the U.S. military in violation of platform rules.
Colin Kahl, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, instructed military commands conducting online psychological operations to provide a full report on their activities by next month after the White House and several federal agencies expressed growing concern over the Defense Department’s alleged attempts to influence audiences abroad, according to several defense and administration officials familiar with the matter.
Last month, researchers from Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory revealed that in recent years Twitter and Facebook had removed more than 150 fake personas and media sites created in the United States. Although researchers did not attribute the fake accounts to the U.S. military, two officials familiar with the matter said that U.S. Central Command (Centcom) is among those whose activities are under close scrutiny. Like others interviewed for this report, they spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military operations.
The researchers did not specify when the removals occurred, but those familiar with the matter said it happened over the past two to three years. According to them, some were recent and involved summer posts promoting anti-Russian narratives, referencing the Kremlin’s “imperialist” war in Ukraine and warning about the direct impact of the conflict on Central Asian countries. Notably, the fake personas using tactics similar to those used by countries such as Russia and China did not gain significant popularity, while authentic accounts actually attracted more followers. Centcom, headquartered in Tampa, conducts military operations in 21 countries across the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. A spokesperson for the organization declined to comment.
Brigadier General Patrick Ryder, Pentagon press secretary, said in a statement that military information operations “support our national security priorities” and must be conducted in accordance with applicable laws and policies. “We are committed to ensuring compliance with these safeguards,” he said.
Representatives of Facebook and Twitter declined to comment.
According to the researchers’ report, the removed accounts included a fictional Persian-language media site that reposted content copied from U.S.-funded Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Another was linked to a Twitter handle that previously claimed to act on behalf of Centcom.
According to the report, one fake account posted an inflammatory tweet claiming that relatives of deceased Afghan refugees reported bodies being returned from Iran with missing organs. The tweet linked to a video that was part of an article published on a website connected to the U.S. military.
Centcom did not comment on whether these accounts were created by its personnel or contractors. If the organ-removal tweet is proven to be linked to Centcom, one Defense Department official said, it would be “a complete violation of doctrine and training practice.”
Independently of the report, The Washington Post learned that in 2020 Facebook disabled fictional personas created by Centcom to counter disinformation spread by China suggesting that the coronavirus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic was created in a U.S. Army lab in Fort Detrick, Maryland. According to officials, the pseudonymous profiles active in Facebook groups communicating in Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu were used to distribute accurate information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention about the virus’s origins in China.
The use of ersatz accounts by the U.S. government on social media, while legal and policy-compliant, has sparked controversy within the Biden administration, as the White House pressed the Pentagon to clarify and justify its policy. The White House, agencies such as the State Department, and even some Defense Department officials were concerned that counter-disinformation policies were being interpreted too broadly. This could allow tactics that, even when used to spread truthful information, risk undermining trust in the United States, several officials said.
“Our adversaries operate entirely in the information space,” said a second senior Defense Department official. “Some believe we should do nothing covert in this space. However, yielding to an adversary would be unwise. But we need stronger policy guardrails.”
A spokesperson for the National Security Council, part of the White House, declined to comment.
Kahl presented his review at a virtual meeting convened by the National Security Council, saying he wanted to know what types of operations were conducted, who they targeted, what tools were used, why commanders chose these tactics, and how effective they were, according to several officials.
Essentially, the message was: “You need to explain to me why you are doing these things,” said one Defense Department official.
Defense Department policy and doctrine does not encourage spreading falsehoods, but there are no specific rules explicitly requiring truth-only content in psychological operations. For example, the military sometimes uses fiction and satire for persuasive purposes, but messages are generally expected to be fact-based, officials said.
In 2020, Facebook and Twitter contacted the Pentagon to express concern about fake accounts they were removing, suspecting links to the military. That summer, David Agranovich, Facebook’s director of global threat disruption, spoke with Christopher S. Miller, then assistant director for special operations/low-intensity conflict, who oversees soft power influence policy, warning him that if Facebook could identify them, adversaries could too, according to several people present during the conversation.
“His point,” one witness said, “was: ‘Guys, you got caught. This is a problem.’”
Before Miller could take action, he was appointed head of another agency — the National Counterterrorism Center. Then the November elections occurred, and the Trump administration ran out of time to address the issue, although Miller served as acting Secretary of Defense in the final weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency.
With the rising role of Russia and China as strategic rivals, military leaders sought to respond, including in the information domain. Congress supported this. Frustrated by perceived legal barriers to covert cyber operations, Congress passed legislation in late 2019 confirming that the military may conduct operations in the “information environment” to protect the United States and counter foreign disinformation. Known as Section 1631, the measure allows covert psychological operations without violating CIA jurisdiction, reducing interagency friction.
“Army commanders were very excited,” a Defense Department official recalled. “They were eager to use these new authorities. Contractors were equally eager to secure lucrative covert contracts.”
At the same time, officials said commanders were not trained to oversee technically complex contractor-run operations or coordinate them across government agencies.
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President Biden (right), Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (left), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley attend a Pentagon ceremony marking the September 11 remembrance. (Lee Vogel/Bloomberg)
Last year, after the new administration took office, Facebook’s Agranovich made another attempt. This time he raised concerns with Anne Neuberger, Deputy National Security Advisor for Cybersecurity. According to people familiar with the exchange, Agranovich said Facebook was removing fake accounts because they violated the company’s terms of service.
The accounts were easily detected by Facebook, which had strengthened its detection capabilities after Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. In some cases, the company removed profiles that appeared linked to military actors spreading information fact-checkers considered false, a source said.
Agranovich also spoke with Pentagon officials. His message was: “We know what the Department of Defense is doing. It violates our rules. We will enforce our policy, and the Pentagon must stop this,” according to a U.S. official briefed on the matter.
In response to White House concerns, Kahl ordered a review of military information support operations — the Pentagon’s term for psychological operations. The review concluded that policy, training, and oversight needed strengthening, and coordination with agencies such as the State Department and CIA needed improvement, officials said.
The review also found that instances of misinformation were due to inadequate contractor oversight and training, not systemic issues, officials said.
According to two officials, Pentagon leadership did little with the findings before Graphika and Stanford published their report on August 24, triggering widespread media coverage and questions for the military.
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Army psychological operations graduates receive badges at the end of field training labeled “Persuasion, Change, Influence.” (Cynthia McIntyre/Fort Hunter Liggett Public Affairs)
The State Department and CIA have expressed concerns about military use of such tactics. The State Department warned the Pentagon: “Do not damage our policy efforts by using fake accounts; we do not want to be seen as creators of false mass messaging,” a Defense Department official said.
A State Department spokesperson said: “Generally speaking, we should not use the same tactics as our adversaries, because we rely on moral authority. We promote values globally, and using such tactics undermines who we are.”
Covert influence operations are not new for the military, but the rise of Western social media has expanded tactics, including the use of artificial personas and imagery, sometimes called “deepfakes.” The logic is that messages attributed to an Afghan woman or Iranian student may be more persuasive than those openly tied to the U.S. government.
Officials said most military influence operations are overt, promoting U.S. policy openly. Covert tactics may be used for specific goals, such as infiltrating terrorist chat groups.
A key question now for policymakers is whether covert military operations are effective. “Is the juice worth the squeeze? Does our approach deliver the return on investment we expected, or does it create more problems?” said one senior official.
The Graphika and Stanford report found limited impact, noting that most posts received only a few likes or retweets, and only 19% of fake accounts had more than 1,000 followers. “Notably,” the report said, “the most popular assets were open accounts publicly acknowledging ties to the U.S. military.”
Covert influence operations play a limited role in military activities but must be tightly controlled and supervised by military and civilian leadership, said Michael Lumpkin, former senior Pentagon official for information operations policy. “Otherwise, we risk making more enemies than allies,” he said.